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ADMIRALTY LAW: DISTRICT COURT REFUSES TO
FOLLOW EQUAL DIVISION OF DAMAGES RULE IN CASE
OF MUTUAL FAULT
IN American admiralty law, damages resulting from a maritime
collision attributable to the fault of both parties are apportioned
between the parties equally, without regard to the degree of fault of
each. Since its inception, various criticisms have been leveled at this
"divided damages rule," but courts have continued to adhere stub-
bornly to its application. The recent case of N. M. Patterson & Sons,
Ltd. v. City of Chicago1 breaks with this tradition and apportions
damages according to the fault of each party.
The Patterson case arose out of a collision between the ship
Torondoc and a drawbridge owned by respondent, City of Chicago.
The ship owner, Patterson, filed a libel against the city for damages
allegedly caused by the city's failure to maintain their bridge so that
it could be properly raised. The city cross-libeled for damages to
the bridge asserting the Torondoc's failure to comply with the navi-
gation rules applying to ships proceeding under drawbridges. The
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, finding both the
city and the Torondoc negligent in several particulars,2 held the
1209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1962). For other attempts to apportion damages
according to fault, see Marine Field Transp. Corp. v. The Tug Ruth, 135 F. Supp.
371 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 23 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1955); Tracy Towing Line, Inc. v. City
of Jersey City, 105 F. Supp. 910 (D.N.J. 1952); Hudson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
263 Fed. 730 (W.D. Pa. 1911); The Mary Ida, 20 Fed. 741 (S.D. Ala. 1884).
-'The Torondoc was found negligent in proceeding at a speed in excess of the
statutory limit for passing under a drawbridge, failing to sound a whistle signal, failing
to stop short of a collision, being in the control of an inexperienced master, and in
proceeding under the assumption that the drawbridge would open. The rules
applicable to the Torondoc were those formulated by the Coast Guard under
authority of Navigation Rules for Great Lakes, Chapt. 64, Rule 27 § 3, 28 Stat. 649
(1895), as amended, 1946 Reorg. Plan No. 3, 60 Stat. 1097 (1946), 33 U.S.C. § 243 (1958);
those formulated by the Secretary of the Army under authority of Bridges Over
Navigable Waters § 6, 32 Stat. 374 (1902), 33 U.S.C. § 499 (1958); and those formulated
in the MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 38-30.
The city's negligence stemmed from failure to inspect and properly maintain the
electrical system of the bridge and failure to warn the Torondoc that the bridge
had not been adequately opened. The rules of the Secretary of the Army, supra,
governed the operation of drawbridges. 209 F. Supp. at 581.
That the case of a ship in collision with a land object is now treated as a proper
subject of admiralty jurisdiction, see Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 62 Stat.
496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 470 (1958).
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collision to be two-thirds the fault of the vessel and one-third the
fault of the city, and, over the objection of both parties, apportioned
damages accordingly.3
Realizing that its decision was not in accord with the established
admiralty rule, the court endeavored to develop a basis for deviating
from such long established precedent. The district judge deter-
mined that the equal division rule was adopted from the English
courts only to avoid the total bar of contributory negligence in cases
where apportionment of fault was impossible.4 The principal cases
that followed The Catherine,5 the leading case establishing the equal
division rule, were examined in an effort to show that in no instance
had the Supreme Court ever enforced equal division of damages in
the face of an express finding of specific degrees of fault.6 More-
over, the court found the use of the term "mutual fault" in the early
cases meant either "equal fault" or "mutual in specific proportional
degrees" and thus, no disharmony existed between this case and the
earlier decisions.7  From this analysis, the court concluded that no
authority explicitly prohibited apportioning damages to fault in a
particular instance.
The court next considered the argument that to apportion
damages according to fault was fully as arbitrary as the divided
damages rule. Negating this contention, Judge Miner pointed to
cases and statutes regarding seamen's personal injuries and deaths
on the seas in which the plaintiff's own fault is taken into account
to mitigate the damages allowed," thus contending that to apportion
1209 F. Supp. at 582. The objection of the city is difficult to grasp because in
this case, as decided, it received a judgment of $888.00, while under the equal division
rule it would have been ordered to pay $3,168.00. Possibly it was only trying to avoid
reversible error or perhaps it is a further manifestation of admiralty's infatuation
with the equal division rule.
6Id. at 583-84. It seems that some of the English decisions in favor of equal
division arose out of instances where it was nearly impossible to ascertain not only
the degree of fault, but also whether both were in fact at fault. See Vaux v. Sheffer,
8 Moore 75, 86, 14 Eng. Rep. 30, 34 (H.L. 1852).
"58 U.S. (17 How.) 169 (1854). Here the Supreme Court reversed a lower court
finding that only one vessel was at fault, thus reaching the question of damages, The
Court then adopted what it felt to be the prevailing Eng!ish rule. This result was
defended as practical "under the circumstances usually attending these disasters." Id.
at 178.
" The cases relied on by the court were The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U.S. 466
(1909); The North Star, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 17 (1882); and Atlee v. Union Packet Co.,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874).
7 209 F. Supp. at 587.
8 209 F. Supp. at 589-90. Both the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) § 33,
41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920). 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958), and the Death on the High Seas Act
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damages in cases of collision was no more difficult or arbitrary than
to do so in personal injury cases. The Max Morris," most often
relied upon today for the proposition that personal injury damages
are to be apportioned according to fault,10 was cited for the broader
proposition that the equal division rule should not be blindly fol-
lowed; that it is at best "rustic," and admiralty courts should be
concerned with "enlarged principles of justice and equity" when
finding damages in all cases of "marine tort.""
Other courts and commentators have spoken out against the arti-
ficiality and arbitrariness of the divided damages rule, some stressing
the incongruity of different rules for personal injury and collision
damages.12  As early as 1896, an English jurist, concerned with the
injustice of the rule in his country, indicated that the then recently
decided case, The Max Morris, spelled the end of the equal damages
rule in the United States.13 However, the Supreme Court's use of
6, 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1958), require the trial court to proportion
damages in order to mitigate plaintiff's recovery. See generally GmmoRE 9- BLACK, Tm
LAW OF ADMIRALTY (hereinafter referred to as GILMORE & BLACK) 279-304 (1957).
Accord, Pope 9: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.
v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1939); Ulster Oil Transp. Corp. v. The Matton No. 20,
210 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1954).
0 137 U.S. 1 (1890). A stevedore, not employed by the ship, was injured while
loading coal aboard The Max Morris.
10 See cases cited note 8 supra.
1 137 U.S. at 12-13.
22 See In re Adam's Petition, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 977
(1955); Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954); Ulster
Oil Transp. Corp. v. The Matton No. 20, 210 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1954) (dissent);
National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950) (dis-
sent); cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); The Margaret, 30 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 279 U.S. 862 (1929); Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at
Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928); Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages In
Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CAL. L. REv. 304 (1957).
Perhaps the most severe criticism of the equal division rule is the existence of three
methods of avoiding its application. The so-called "Major-Minor Fault Rule" allows
the lesser fault to be totally discounted, if the court feels it to be insignificant. The
doctrine of "Errors in Extremis" permits a vessel under the danger of collision to
respond in a way that would be violative of navigation rules under normal circum-
stances. Lastly, a lesser fault is often held to be a "non-contributory fault." See
GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF COLLISION §§214-23, 224-26, 233-35 (1949).
Inasmuch as general negligence law applies to liability for maritime collision, the
"last clear chance" doctrine has also been used to avoid application of the divided
damages rule much in the same manner that it mitigates the contributory negligence
rule at common law. To apply the "last dear chance" doctrine there must be a clear
"cleavage" between all the foregoing faults and the final "avoidable" fault bringing
about the collision. Some cases deny that the doctrine has any place in collision
cases. GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra § 215.
23 Franck, Collisions at Sea and Relation to International Maritime Law, 12 L.Q.
Rav. 260, 272 (1896). However, The Max Morris has not been so interpreted by most
courts. See, e.g., Ulster Oil Tramp. Corp. v. The Matton No. 20, 210 F.2d 106, 110
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both broad and specific language in this opinion makes the specific
holding of The Max Morris somewhat cloudy. While there are
passages asserting that the equal division rule is not to be indis-
criminately applied,14 there is likewise language indicating that the
Court merely decided that in cases of maritime personal injury,
contributory negligence is not a complete bar to recovery.15 The
interpretation of that opinion in the instant cases is not without
support,' 6 but The Max Morris is generally cited only as having,
established the proportional damage rule in cases of personal
injury.'7
Even if The Max Morris decision is capable of being inter-
preted as in the instant case, no court is free from the overwhelming
precedent of the equal division rule. The fact is that out of defer-
ence to the Supreme Court, lower courts simply do not apportion
damages according to fault, regardless of how prior cases might be,
manipulated. For example, in The Margaret,18 the Third Circuit
first modified the decision of the lower court by apportioning dam-
ages according to fault. Then, expressing doubt as to the propriety
of such a modification on its part, the court on rehearing returned
to the equal division rule, not because it lacked the power to,
apportion damages, but out of deference to the Supreme Court.'
Likewise, the Second Circuit in AhIgren v. Red Star Towing &,
Transp. Co.,20 while commenting that the rule was patently unjust,
held that its enunciation by the Supreme Court and unexplainable-
(2d Cir. 1954) (dissent). See also Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952), where the Court cites the cases dealing with collision,
damages and excludes The Max Morris.
"I "While the libellant could not be rewarded for his negligence at the expense of
the vessel, she should be held responsible for her negligence ..... 137 U.S. at 13.
(Emphasis added.)
"[]n cases of marine torts ... courts of Admiralty could exercise a conscientious.
discretion, and give or withhold damages upon enlarged principles of justice and'
equity .. " 137 U.S. at 13, quoting from The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) I,
52 (1826).
2r "Whether ... the decree should be for exactly one-half of the damages sustained,
or ... be for a greater or less proportion of such damages, is a question not presented"
for our determination upon this record, and we express no opinion upon it." 137
U.S. at 15.
"8 See The Victory, 68 Fed. 395, 400 (4th Cir. 1895), revd on other grounds, 168'
U.S. 410 (1897); GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at §§ 245-47; Staring, supra note 12, at
342.
11 See cases cited note 8 supra.
"30 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 862 (1929).191 d. at 928.
20 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954).
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longevity required the lower courts to await congressional action
or a reversal by the Supreme Court.21 The same approach was taken
in In re Adams' Petition22 in which the district court first appor-
tioned damages on the basis of a decided difference in degrees of
fault, but on reargument adopted the position of the Ahlgren
case.23 The circuit court affirmed the result as the only one which
the court was at liberty to affirm regardless of the "inherent injustice
of this rule."24
Congress as yet has done little more than the lower courts in deal-
ing with the divided damages rule. In 1910, the United States
refused to become a signatory to the Brussels Convention which
provides for proportional damages based on degrees of fault.25
Furthermore, a recent Senate bill, providing for proportional dam-
ages in cases where a finding of such fact could be made, received
heavy support from American shipping interests, the American Bar
Association; and some practicing attorneys26 but was never brought
to a vote. While the Senate fell short of enactment of a proportional
damage rule, the introduction of the bill and the hearings indicate
an awareness in some quarters that the courts will not act in their
own initiative to change the equal division rule and that legislative
action is required.
All do not agree, however, that the Second and Third Circuits
are correct in awaiting congressional or Supreme Court action to
resolve this problem. One commentator asserts that the lower court
judges should be permitted to manipulate the Supreme Court
decisions because in no case has the Supreme Court ever declared
the equal division rule to be the exclusive rule as to damages in
marine cases. 27  Another implies this much when he asserts that
no "principle"' of admiralty would be violated if a proportional
damage rule existed side by side with the equal division rule, the
latter to be used only when a finding of fact as to proportion of
"'Id. at 620-21.
- 125 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aefd, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 971 (1957).
21125 F. Supp. at 112, 115.
2In re Adams' Petition, 237 F.2d 884, 887 (2d Cir. 1956).
21 Article 4 of the Convention provided for damages in proportion to fault and has
been signed or adhered to by most of the major maritime nations except for the United
States. GILLMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 439. GRIFFN, op. cit. supra note
12, at § 247.
20 Hearings Before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 30, 149, 150 (1962).
" See Staring, supra note 12, at 342-43.
Vol. 1963: 531]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
fault is not possible.2 To date one court has followed the instant
decision. The District Court for the Northern District of California
in McKeel v. Schroeder recently adopted the reasoning of Judge
Miner in its entirety and ventured the further opinion that the
current Supreme Court would follow the Patterson decision.
While the reasoning of the court in the instant case and the
analysis of the last-mentioned writers may be more equitable, the
decision of the Second and Third Circuits seems to represent the
prevailing judicial attitude toward deviating from the equal division
rule. 0 Inasmuch as Congress has again taken up the matter of
admiralty damages, it seems likely that the courts will adopt a wait-
and-see approach to any far-reaching change on their part. If the
approach of the circuit courts is adopted, this case seems destined for
reversal and then a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court,31
thus, through sheer inertia giving an undesirable rule additional
unwarranted support. Such a situation points up the need for
definitive congressional action or a clarification by the Supreme
Court in order to arrive at an equitable rule and to reach accord
with the rest of the maritime nations.
2 See Huger, supra note 12, at 553-54.
2 - F. Supp. - (1963). The Court's opinion that the Supreme Court would adopt
a proportional damages rule was made without benefit of the Weyerhaeuser decision
which was handed down three days later. See note 31 infra.3 0 See GILMORE & BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 438-42; Staring, supra note 12, at
341-42.
S1 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari several times previously when a circuit
court indicated that it could not apportion damages according to fault owing to
established precedent. See In re Adams' Petition, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957); National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 83 F.2d'
405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); The Margaret, 30 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 862 (1929). See also Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952), where the advocates of Supreme Court change
can find little hope.
The recent case of Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 31 U.S.L. Wavax
4331 (U.S. April 1, 1963), indicates that the present Supreme Court is not at all dis-
satisfied with the divided damages rule. The United States had objected to the in-
clusion of a personal injury award paid by the vessel to a federal employee in the
vessel's total damages of which the United States was bound to pay half. The Court,
in finding that the divided damages rule overrode the Federal Employees Compensa-
tion Act, said of the rule that it was "a rule of admiralty law which, for more than
100 years, has governed with at least equal clarity the correlative rights and duties of
two shipowners whose vessels have been involved in a collision in which both were
at fault." Id. at 4333.
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